Mohammad Owais Khan
Micah A. Hughes
The protests in Istanbul over the past two weeks became increasingly tense as heavy-handed tactics on behalf of the police were met with equally strong reactions by the protestors. Liberal secularist, Kemalist, Kurdish, and leftist groups have joined together in order to oppose what they see as the growing authoritarian rule of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). He represents a new style of conservative leadership interested in moving the country away from the founding secular ideals of the Turkish Republic and towards a more historically sensitive “Neo-Ottoman” direction.
What is often overlooked in the mainstream media is that the shopping mall proposed by the administration isn’t your regular shopping mall. It is in fact a reconstruction of the late Ottoman military barracks built in 1780, which stood in the same place as the park until it was destroyed by modernizers in 1940. The proposed barracks were reconfigured to accommodate outdoor cafes, restaurants and shops. In many ways, with its domes and arches, the new mall is a part of a nationwide restoration project. Gezi park near Taksim Square is in Istanbul’s historically westernized district, hosting the city’s vibrant nightlife, bars, clubs and cafes. It has European styled streets, 5-star hotels and chic modern architecture. But since the rise of the AK party, the city has been embracing its cultural past. Everywhere, historical landmarks that that were left neglected in the dust of a modernizing republic are slowly undergoing a second-life.
Until now, this westernized pocket was largely untouched. The growing frustration of the recent protesters is directly tied to the changing aesthetic of what was “new” Istanbul. Turkey’s westernized upper class has been undergoing an intense episode of claustrophobia as populist reforms are closing in on them from all directions. And this isn’t just some pathology; the AKP has systematically tried to root out the old guard. The most publicized defeats were over the complete transformation of Turkey’s military and corporate media. But also there has been a complete overhaul of the education system. Now women with headscarves are able to attend and teach classes. Children in grade school are given options for private religious education. And a whole new network of colleges continues to be funded by religious foundations. Along with being gradually pushed out of their traditional strongholds, broad economic liberalization designed to increase investment and decrease international debt has ensured the rise of a completely new capitalist class.
The administration claims, for good reasons, that it is the democratically elected representative of the people and the protesters fire back, claiming they are the true voice of the people. Although the mainstream media has reinforced this trope, the issue at stake is not authoritarianism vs. hooliganism-democracy is obviously both electoral and public. However the past two weeks demonstrate that even after free and fair elections a country can be torn by rifts of deep hate between those who are steering the country and proponents of the pre-AKP regime. Somehow neither appeals to the ballot box nor is direct civil disobedience enough to create a politics of love. The intense focus of the western media criticizing administration’s heavy-handed approach raises the question as to why is there no qualitative difference in an Islamist response and say the ruthless response of the NYPD against the “occupy movement” on Wall Street? Do we see anything different from the same old tear gas, brutal arrests, riot police and water cannons witnessed in both Cairo last year and anti-globalization movements in Europe?
The road from nowhere
As the dust settles, some things have become abundantly clear, most notably the deep connection between the failure of the media to address the protests and the deeper marginalization of the secular upper class. Most characterizations of what is taking place have been centered on Erdoğan himself, paying no attention to the history of Turkish secularization, the contested history of Islamist political representation, or the potent fears and hatreds that play a central role. This “road from nowhere” approach that sees the protests as a manifestation of Erdoğan’s political will, misses out on another important tributary feeding into the river of democratic rhetoric, namely how democracy, as conceived by both the protestors and most notably by the government, has failed to take the agonistic nature of its passions to heart.
M. Owais Khan is a doctoral student in the Department of Religion at Syracuse University.
Micah A. Hughes is a master’s student in the Alliance of Civilizations Institute at Fatih Sultan Mehmet University, Istanbul Turkey.